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Abstract
In an evolutionary sender–receiver game that describes how signals be-
come associated with objects (Hurford, 1989; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999),
the set of evolutionarily stable states coincides with the set of strict Nash
strategies—and a language is a strict Nash strategy if and only if it links
each possible referent exclusively to 1 signal and vice versa (Trapa and
Nowak, 2000). As a consequence, a language that displays homonymy (or
synonymy)—the property that one signal is linked to more than one refer-
ent (or one referent to more than one signal)—cannot be an evolutionarily
stable state. This seems to conﬂict with the results of the computer sim-
ulation reported in Nowak and Krakauer (1999) that lend support to the
conjecture that a language in which the same signal is used for more than
one object can be evolutionarily stable. This paper provides necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for a neutrally stable state of this game—and, impor-
tantly, these conditions directly characterize a single strategy—showing
that a language displaying homonymy or synonymy, even though it fails
to be evolutionarily stable (in the strict sense), may still satisfy neutral
stability, explaining why an evolutionary process does not necessarily lead
away from it. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: C72
KEYWORDS: Language, Coordination, Evolutionary Stability, Neu-
tral Stability
1 Introduction
Bringing together theories about the evolution of language and evolutionary
game theory recently has attracted some interest in both linguistics and applied
mathematics.1
∗Department of Economics, University of Vienna; Christina.Pawlowitsch@univie.ac.at
1See, for example, the work of J. Hurford and S. Kirby in linguistics; here a good reference
is Christiansen and Kirby (2003). And the work initiated by M. Nowak and others in applied
mathematics and theoretical biology; for a good review article of this strand of literature see
Nowak, Komarowa and Niyogi (2003).
1This paper takes up the issue of a speciﬁc sender–receiver game, ﬁrst intro-
duced in Hurford (1989) and further analyzed in Nowak and Krakauer (1999)
and Trapa and Nowak (2000), that allows to study the evolution of so called
proto–languages from an essentially prelinguistic environment. Here, the term
proto–language is simply understood as a collection of correspondences between
a ﬁnite number of events that are possibly communicated and a ﬁnite number
of signals that are available to indicate these events.
Evolution of the Saussurean sign
Hurford (1989) is mainly interested in the evolution of the so–called Saussurean
sign, a bidirectional mapping between a phonological form and some represen-
tation of a concept. He starts from the observation that most linguistic theories
take lexical entries that incorporate the idea of the Saussurean sign as an in-
tegral part of the human Language Acquisition Device—that is, as a starting
point. On purely logical grounds, however, successful communication does not
necessarily require bidirectionality. He therefore hypothesizes that there must
have been some evolutionary advantage of this design feature of human lan-
guage over other possible communication strategies. The aim of his work is to
provide a formal argument for this claim. In order to allow for the possibility of
non–bidirectionality, in his model set–up, he ﬁrst has to disentangle the lexical
matrices individuals use for transmission and reception purposes. This leads
to a speciﬁc sender–receiver game, which he approaches in a population based
setting by computer experiments. His main argument ﬁnally consists in show-
ing that individuals who adjust their receiver matrices to their sender matrices
according to some consistency requirements fare considerably better in terms of
their overall potential of successful communication than individuals with other
behavioral rules.
Evolution of a common proto–language
Nowak and Krakauer (1999) take the same sender–receiver game as a starting
point for their exploration of the evolution of language. They also study it via
computer simulations, but they mainly see it as a framework to explain how
meaning of signals can come into being by an evolutionary process that does
not presuppose any ex–ante internalization of concepts, or, for that matter,
rationality. Their simulation, therefore, is much more in the spirit of a replicator
dynamics.
Starting from randomly drawn sender and receiver matrices, in every period,
every individual communicates once with every other individual in the popula-
tion. Payoﬀs are calculated, and in the following period each individual strategy,
that is, a pair of a sender and a receiver matrix, replicates itself according to
its payoﬀ relative to the accumulated payoﬀ in the overall population. After a
certain number of rounds, indeed, speciﬁc signals start to correspond with spe-
ciﬁc events, and ﬁnally the population proﬁle seems to converge to a common
proto–language.
2This type of replicator–imitation dynamics can be interpreted as biological
as well as cultural transmission of the information captured by the sender and
receiver matrices. Individuals that communicate more successfully leave more
oﬀ spring, and parents transmit their sender and receiver matrices to their
kids. Or, what is another interpretation, younger individuals are more likely to
imitate the more successful individuals of the older generation, and so the more
successful sender and receiver matrices spread at the cost of the less successful
ones.
An interesting feature of the common proto–language for which the computer
simulation lends support is that, even though there are as many signals as there
are events, there are some events that share the use of one signal; or, put
diﬀerently, there are some signals that are linked to more than one event. In
linguistics, this phenomenon is called homonymy, as opposed to synonymy that
refers to a situation where one event is linked to more than one signal.
Clearly, as it is generally true for imitation and replication dynamics, the
language to which the simulation converges crucially depends on the initial
conditions. What is surprising, indeed, is that their results also seems to be
stable against the introduction of mutant strategies. From this the authors
draw the conclusion that evolution does not always lead to a proto–language
with maximal communicative potential—that is, where each event is exclusively
linked to one signal and vice versa—but that certain suboptimum solutions
where some signals are linked to more than one event can be evolutionarily
stable.
Is homonymy evolutionarily stable?
Trapa and Nowak (2000) analyze the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable
states of this game. They show that a proto–language, that is, a pair of a
sender and receiver matrix, is an evolutionarily stable state if and only if it is a
strict Nash strategy; and that a language is a strict Nash strategy if and only
if there are as many signals as there are events, the sender matrix attributes
to each event exactly one signal and vice versa—in mathematical terms, if it is
a permutation matrix, and the receiver matrix is the transpose of the sender
matrix. As a consequence, a language with the property of homonymy (or
synonymy) cannot be a strict Nash strategy, and thus it also cannot be an
evolutionarily stable.
Nevertheless, under speciﬁc conditions, homonymy or synonymy can well
prevail in a Nash, though not in a strict Nash equilibrium. Being a Nash equi-
librium is a necessary condition for an evolutionarily stable state. The language
to which the computer simulation reported in Nowak and Krakauer (1999) con-
verges seems to be compatible with these equilibrium conditions. Therefore, an
interesting question to ask is whether a Nash, but not strict Nash language that
displays homonymy (or synonymy), even though it fails to be evolutionarily
stable, may still satisfy a weaker criterion for stability in an evolutionary sense
that allows to understand why an evolutionary process does not lead away from
it.
3In their discussion of Nash strategies, Trapa and Nowak present examples of
both, Nash, but not strict Nash strategies that are, and that are not weak evo-
lutionarily stable state. They conjecture that, in principle, it should be possible
to classify weak evolutionarily stable states for this game.
In the literature, the concept of weak evolutionary stability is also known
as neutral stability2. Neutral stability means that there can be room for drift.
There can be mutant strategies that can invade—there can be coexistence—but
that do not have to invade necessarily. But if a state fails to be neutrally stable,
then this means that there is at least one mutant strategy that, if introduced
into the current strategy proﬁle—even in only small amounts—eventually will
take over. In this sense, there is some evolutionary pressure that leads away
from a state that does not satisfy neutral stability, which is not necessarily true
for a state that does satisfy neutral stability.
This paper gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a Nash strategy
of this game to be a neutrally stable state, showing that Proto–languages
with multi–valued correspondences between signals and events (homomymy)
or events and signals (synonymy), even though they fail to be evolutionarily
stable in the “strict” sense, may still satisfy neutrally stability as long as the
degree of ambiguity is not too high: An event can be linked to more than one
signal, but if this is the case, these signals cannot be used to refer to any other
event. A signal can refer to more than one event, but if this is the case, these
events cannot be linked to any other signal.
Methodologically, the emphasis is on the double symmetry of this game the
best–response properties of sender and receiver matrices, thereby also providing
an alternative discussion of Nash strategies.
Section 2 reviews the model and some deﬁnition. Section 3 restates them in
a convenient way for the class of double symmetric games to which this speciﬁc
sender–receiver game belongs. Section 4 explores the best–response properties
of sender and receiver matrices. Section 5 shows how they can be used to
characterize the Nash strategies of this game. Section 6, ﬁnally, develops the
results on neutrally stable states.
2 The basic model
There is a large number of individuals among whom communication potentially
takes place. There are n events that possibly become the object of communi-
cation, and there are m signals that can be used to communicate these events.
2See the discussion of neutrally stable states in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), and Samuel-
son (1997)
4The n × m–matrix
P =



 



p11 ... p1j ... p1m
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
pi1 ... pij ... pim
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
pn1 ... pnj ... pnm



 
 

denotes an individuals sender matrix, where
P ∈ ∆n×m
w = {P ∈ R
n×m
+ :
m X
j=1
pij ≤ 1,∀i},
the set of all weak stochastic matrices of dimension n×m, and pij indicates the
probability with which signal j will be transmitted if event i is to be communi-
cated. On the other hand, the m × n–matrix
Q =

 

 


q11 ... q1i ... q1n
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
qj1 ... qji ... qjn
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
qm1 ... qmi ... qmn

 

 


denotes an individual’s receiver matrix,
Q ∈ ∆m×n
w = {Q ∈ R
m×n
+ :
n X
i=1
qji ≤ 1,∀i},
and qji gives the probability with which event i will be inferred if signal j is
received. If
Pm
j=1 pij < 1, the interpretation is that there is a residual proba-
bility, 1 −
Pm
j=1 pij, that the possible event i does not induce the remittance
of any signal at all. In this sense, the individual has “no name” for i; and if Pn
i=1 qji < 1, then with probability 1−
Pn
i=1 qji signal j is not associated with
any meaning at all. A pair L = (P,Q) is a language.
If an individual with receiver matrix P observes event i and wants to com-
municate this to an individual with language Q0, then the probability that she
successfully is doing so, is
m X
j=1
pijq0
ji.
Assuming that the objects of communication occur with equal frequencies,
f(P,Q0) =
X
i
Pm
j=1 pijq0
ji
n
can be taken as a measure for the potential of successful communication of an
individual with the sender matrix P relative to an individual with the receiver
matrix Q0.
5The stage game
This set–up can be rephrased as a two–player symmetric game. The players of
this game are the individuals. They all face the same strategy sets and payoﬀ
functions. A strategy of the game is a language,
L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m, (1)
where
Ln,m = ∆n×m
w × ∆m×n
w (2)
is the strategy set. Assuming that communication is mutually beneﬁcial and
that the events of potential communication occur with equal frequencies—or,
are equally important—a suitable form of the payoﬀ function is given by
F(L,L0) =
1
2
n X
i=1
m X
j=1
pijq0
ji +
1
2
n X
i=1
m X
j=1
p0
ijqji
=
1
2
tr(PQ0) +
1
2
tr(P0Q). (3)
Note that this payoﬀ function is symmetric,
F(L,L0) = tr(PQ0) + tr(P0Q) = tr(P0Q) + tr(PQ0) = F(L0,L),
giving rise to a double symmetric game.
Deﬁnitions
In the terminology of evolutionary game theory, for a symmetric game, a strat-
egy is called “Nash” if it is a best reply to itself—that is, if it is the strategy
played in a symmetric Nash equilibrium; and it is called “strict Nash” if it is
the unique best reply to itself.
Deﬁnition 1. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m.
(a) L is a Nash strategy if
F(L,L) ≥ F(L0,L) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m;
(b) L is a strict Nash strategy if
F(L,L) > F(L0,L) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m with L0 6= L.
The most central stability concept in evolutionary game theory is evolution-
ary stability. It captures the idea that the population proﬁle has reached a state
that cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy that occurs within suﬃciently
small boundaries, whereas in a neutrally stable state there is room for drift.
Equivalent criteria are given by the following deﬁnitions.
6Deﬁnition 2. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m.
(a) L is an evolutionarily stable state if and only if
(i) L is a Nash strategy, and
(ii) F(L,L) = F(L0,L) ⇒ F(L0,L0) < F(L,L0) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m;
(b) L is a neutrally stable state if and only if
(i) L is a Nash strategy, and
(ii) F(L,L) = F(L0,L) ⇒ F(L0,L0) ≤ F(L,L0) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m.
From these deﬁnitions one directly sees that:
strict Nash ⇒ evolutionarily stable state ⇒ neutrally stable state ⇒ Nash.
3 Symmetrized games
The underlying stage game we are dealing with is best understood as the sym-
metrized version of an asymmetric game according to Selten (1980). In the
asymmetric game there are two types of players, senders and receivers. Let
senders be of type 1 and receivers of type 2. Then the strategy sets and payoﬀ
functions are
S1 = ∆n×m
w ,
S2 = ∆n×m
w ;
and
f1(s1,s2) = tr(s1s2),
f2(s1,s2) = tr(s1s2),
with (s1,s2) ∈ S1 × S2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. Note that f1(s1,s2) =
f2(s1,s2), which means that even though interacting players are of diﬀerent
types, they get the same payoﬀ out of their interaction.
Assuming that individuals ﬁnd themselves in the roles of sender and receivers
with equal probabilities, the payoﬀ function of the symmetrized game is given
by
F[(s1,s2),(s0
1,s0
2)] =
1
2
f1(s1,s0
2) +
1
2
f2(s0
1,s2),
where (s1,s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a strategy of the symmetrized game.
It is not generally true that the payoﬀ function of a symmetrized game is
symmetric! This is only the case if f1(s1,s2) = f2(s1,s2). Then,
F[(s1,s2),(s0
1,s0
2)] =
1
2
f1(s1,s0
2) +
1
2
f2(s0
1,s2)
=
1
2
f2(s1,s0
2) +
1
2
f1(s0
1,s2) = F[(s0
1,s0
2),(s1,s2)].
7Let P ∈ ∆n×m
w and Q ∈ ∆m×n
w . Then according to the usual deﬁnition,
B(P) = {Q ∈ ∆m×n
w : tr(PQ) ≥ tr(PQ0) ∀ Q0 ∈ ∆m×n
w }
denotes the set of best responses to P; and
B(Q) = {P ∈ ∆n×m
w : tr(PQ) ≥ tr(P0Q) ∀ P0 ∈ ∆n×m
w }
denotes the set of best responses to Q. Clearly, for ﬁxed P, the continuous
function tr(PQ) attains a maximum on the compact set ∆m×n
w ; and, for ﬁxed
Q, tr(PQ) attains a maximum on ∆m×n
w . So, B(P) and B(Q) are both non–
empty.
It is generally true that (s1,s2) is a Nash strategy of the symmetrized game
if and only if s1 is a best response to s2, and s1 is a best response to s2—and
(s1,s2) is a strict Nash strategy if and only if s1 is the unique best response to
s2, and s1 is the unique best response to s2.
To see why this is so, suppose that (s1,s2) ∈ S1 × S2 is a Nash strategy,
but that s1 / ∈ B(s2). So, there is some s0
1 ∈ S1, s0
1 6= s1 such that f1(s0
1,s2) >
f1(s1,s2). Consider (s0
1,s2) as an alternative strategy in the symmetrized game,
then
f1(s1,s2) + f2(s1,s2) < f1(s0
1,s2) + f2(s1,s2)
⇐⇒ F[(s1,s2),(s1,s2)] < F[(s0
1,s2),(s1,s2)]
but this cannot be true if (s1,s2) is a Nash strategy.
The strict part works by an analogous argument. Suppose that (s1,s2) is a
strict Nash strategy, but that there also exists some s0
1 ∈ B(s2) with s0
1 6= s1.
Then,
f1(s1,s2) + f2(s1,s2) = f1(s0
1,s2) + f2(s1,s2)
⇐⇒ F[(s1,s2),(s1,s2)] = F[(s0
1,s2),(s1,s2)],
which cannot be true if (s1,s2) is a strict Nash strategy.
Note that this argument does not require that f1(s1,s2) = f2(s1,s2). Suﬃ-
ciency follows directly from the deﬁnition of best–response sets. 3
For the sender–receiver game under consideration this implies the following:
3Selten (1980) shows that for the symmetrized version of an asymmetric game it is generally
true that (s1,s2) is an evolutionarily stable state if an only if it is a strict symmetric Nash
equilibrium. The proof of this is quite intuitive. Let [(s1,s2)] a Nash but not a strict Nash
strategy. Suppose that in addition to s1 there is some s0
1 6= s1 with s0
1 ∈ B(S2), and consider
the pair (s0
1,s2) as an invading strategy. Then, f1(s0
1,s2)+f2(s1,s2) = f1(s1,s2)+f2(s1,s2),
which means that F[(s0
1,s2),(s1,s2)] = F[(s1,s2),(s1,s2)]. But, as a consequence, f1(s1,s2)+
f2(s0
1,s2) = f1(s0
1,s2)+f2(s0
1,s2), which means that F[(s1,s2),(s0
1,s2)] = F[(s0
1,s2),(s0
1,s2)];
and so (s1,s2) cannot be evolutionarily stable. The crucial point here is that, since f1(s0
1,s2) =
f1(s1,s2), the strategy (s1,s2) has no chance to attain a higher payoﬀ against (s0
1,s2), then
(s0
1,s2) attains against itself. Note, that this argument does not require that f1(s1,s2) =
f2(s1,s2). The coincidence of evolutionarily stable states and strict Nash strategies for the
sender–receiver game under consideration can be seen as a speciﬁc incidence of this more
general result.
8Lemma 1. Suppose L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m. Then
(a) L is a Nash strategy if and only if P ∈ B(Q) and Q ∈ B(P);
(b) L is a strict Nash strategy if and only if B(Q) = {P} and B(P) = {Q},
that is, P is the unique element in B(Q) and Q is the unique element in
B(P).
Corollary 1. L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m is a Nash but not strict Nash strategy if and
only if
– P ∈ B(Q) and Q ∈ B(P), and
– there exists some P0 ∈ B(Q) with P0 6= P, or some Q0 ∈ B(P) with
Q0 6= Q.
This follows directly from Lemma 1. Just note that, since (P,Q0) and (P0,Q)
are both diﬀerent from (P,Q), it is indeed suﬃcient that either P is not unique
in B(Q) or that Q is not unique in B(P).
Remark 1. For the speciﬁc payoﬀ function of this game, if Q ∈ B(P) and
Q0 ∈ B(P), as well as P ∈ B(Q) and P0 ∈ B(Q) then
tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ) = tr(P0Q).
Double symmetric games
For a symmetric payoﬀ function—irrespective of whether this comes from the
symmetrization of an asymmetric game or not—the stability notions of Deﬁni-
tion 2 can be stated in a more convenient way.
Lemma 2. If F(L,L0) = F(L0,L), then Deﬁnition 2 can be rewritten as:
Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m.
(a) L is an evolutionarily stable state if and only if
(i) L is a Nash strategy, and
(ii) F(L,L) = F(L0,L) ⇒ F(L0,L0) < F(L,L) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m;
(b) L is a neutrally stable state if and only if
(i) L is a Nash strategy, and
(ii) F(L,L) = F(L0,L) ⇒ F(L0,L0) ≤ F(L,L) for all L0 ∈ Ln,m.
Remark 2. For the speciﬁc form of the payoﬀ function that we use, Deﬁnition
2 can be restated as follows:
Let L = (P,Q) ∈ ∆n×m × ∆m×n.
(a) L is an evolutionarily stable state if and only if
9(i) tr(PQ0) ≤ tr(PQ) for all Q0 ∈ ∆m×n and
tr(P0Q) ≤ tr(PQ) for all P0 ∈ ∆n×m; and
(ii) tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ) = tr(P0Q) =⇒ tr(P0Q0) < tr(PQ).
(b) L is a neutrally stable state if and only if
(i) tr(PQ0) ≤ tr(PQ) for all Q0 ∈ ∆m×n and
tr(P0Q) ≤ tr(PQ) for all P0 ∈ ∆n×m; and
(ii) tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ) = tr(P0Q) =⇒ tr(P0Q0) ≤ tr(PQ).
4 Best–response properties of sender and receiver
matrices
Suppose now that we are given a speciﬁc P and we want to ﬁnd all the re-
ceiver matrices Q that maximize tr(PQ). Since the elements in Q are row–wise
bounded to add up to 1, for ﬁxed P, it is convenient to understand the operator
tr(PQ) as multiplying the j-th column of P with the j-th row of Q, and then
summing over all j:
tr(PQ) =
X
i
X
j
pijqji =
X
j
X
i
pijqji
= p11q11 + p21q12 ··· + pn1q1n
+ p12q21 + p22q22 ··· + pn2q2n
. . .
+ p1mqm1 + p2mqm2 ··· + pnmqmn.
Finding a Q that maximizes tr(PQ) then amounts to choosing optimal “weights”
qji to their corresponding elements pij such that
P
i pijqji is maximal for every
j.
Fix, for example, the j?-th column of P and suppose that it contains a unique
maximal element, say pi?j?. Then in order to maximize
P
i pij?qj?i it is clearly
the optimal choice to put “full weight” to pi?j?—that is, to set qj?i? equal to
1, and all the other elements in the j?-th row equal to zero. If, on the other
hand, the j?-th column of P contains more than one maximal element, then
there is more than one optimal appointment of the elements in the j?-th row
of Q. All the corner solutions, where full weight is put to any of the maximal
elements in the j?-th column of P, as well as any of their convex combinations
fulﬁll the task of maximizing
P
i pij?qj?i. But no matter how the total mass of
1 is attached to the elements in the j?-th column of P, there is no way of doing
better than to “extract” from the j?-th column of P the value of its maximum.
If Q is ﬁxed and the entries in P are to be chosen optimally so that tr(PQ)
is maximized, exactly the same logic applies only with the roles of P and Q
reversed. Note that, in this case, one proceeds by columns of Q and rows of P.
10The next two lemmas summarize these best–response properties of P and
Q. Some extra notation helps exposition. We deﬁne
A(p·j) = argmaxi(pij)
as the index set of maximal row elements of the j-th column of P, and analo-
gously,
A(q·i) = argmaxj(qji)
as the index set of maximal row elements of the i-th column of Q.
Lemma 3 (Best–response properties of P and Q). Let P ∈ ∆n×m
w and
Q ∈ ∆m×n
w .
(1) Suppose Q ∈ B(P).
(a) If pi?j? 6= maxi(pij?) then qj?i? = 0.
(b) If maxi(pij?) 6= 0 then
X
i∈A(p·j?)
qj?i = 1 and qj?i = 0 ∀ i / ∈ A(p·j?).
(2) Suppose P ∈ B(Q).
(a) If qj?i? 6= maxj(qji?) then pi?j? = 0.
(b) If maxj(qji?) 6= 0 then
X
j∈A(q·i?)
pi?j = 1 and pi?j = 0 ∀ j / ∈ A(q·i?).
Corollary 2. Let P ∈ ∆n×m and Q ∈ ∆m×n.
(1) Suppose Q ∈ B(P). If A(p·j?) = {i?} then
qj?i? = 1 and qj?i = 0 ∀ i 6= i?.
(2) Suppose P ∈ B(Q). If A(q·i?) = {j?} then
pi?j? = 1 and pi?j = 0 ∀ j 6= j?.
Lemma 4. Let P ∈ ∆n×m and Q ∈ ∆m×n.
(1) For ﬁxed P,
max
qji


X
j
X
i
pijqji

 =
X
j
max
i
(pij).
11(2) For ﬁxed Q,
max
pij


X
i
X
j
pijqji

 =
X
i
max
j
(qji).
How to ﬁnd the set of all Q–s that are a best response to a given P or vice
versa is best understood by looking at speciﬁc examples.
Example 1.
P1 =


1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 − x x


x∈(0,1)
, B(P1) =





1 − y y 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

 : y ∈ [0,1]



.
Note that B(P1) also includes the two “corner solutions”
Q1,y=0 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

 and Q1,y=1


0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

.
It is easy to check that
tr(P1Q1) =
X
j
max
i
pij = 1 + (1 − x) + x = 2.
for all Q1 ∈ B(P1).
Note that for all Q1 ∈ B(P1) it is also true that P1 is a best response to Q1.
So, for this special example, all pairs L1 = (P1,Q1) with Q ∈ B(P1) are Nash
strategies of this game. Note that this also includes the two pairs involving the
two corner solutions
(P1,Q1,y=0) =





1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 − x x


x∈(0,1)
,


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1




,
and
(P1,Q1,y=1) =





1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 − x x


x∈(0,1)
,


0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1




.
Clearly, non of these pairs is a strict Nash strategy, which is immediate from the
fact that B(P1) contains more than one element. As languages all these pairs
L1 = (P1,Q) with Q1 ∈ B(P1) display homonymy as well as synonymy.
12Information revealed by best response
On the other hand, if we are given a speciﬁc Q and we know that Q ∈ B(P),
is there anything we can learn about P? To illustrate this, consider one of the
elements Q1 in B(P1) from the previous example, say
Q1,y=0 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

.
Now we must try to derive conclusions from rows in Q1,y=0 to corresponding
columns in P1. The unique 1 in the third row of Q1,y=0 came from the fact that
p33 = x was the unique maximal entry in the third column of P1. The question
is, can we learn this, just by observing q33 = 1? We deﬁnitely understand that
p33 must have been a maximal element of the third column of P1—otherwise
putting some weight to this element could not have been optimal, but we cannot
conclude that p33 was the unique maximal element of this column. There could
have been some other maximal elements in this column. As we have seen above,
all the corner solutions that attribute full weight to any of the maximal elements
of a speciﬁc column are optimal solutions. Analogously, from q23 = 1 we learn
that p32 is a maximal element of the second column of P1, as well as that we
learn from q11 = 1 that p11 is a maximal element of the ﬁrst column of P1. So,
all we possibly know about P1 from the fact that Q1,y=0 ∈ B(P1) is that
P1 =


maxi(pi1) − −
− − −
− maxi(pi2) maxi(pi3)

.
Note that, since this speciﬁc Q1,y=0 ∈ B(P1) puts no weight to the second
maximal element of the ﬁrst column of P1, we have no way to understand that
there was any other maximal element in this column.
As another example, consider the matrix
Q1,0<y<1 =


1 − y y 0
0 0 1
0 0 1


y∈(0,1)
,
which, as we have seen above, also is an element of B(P1). By the same logic
as above, we now learn that
P1 =


maxi(pi1) − −
maxi(pi1) − −
− maxi(pi2) maxi(pi3)

.
Nevertheless, we still cannot exclude the possibility that there were other max-
imal elements in any of the columns of P1. But, the interesting thing in this
case is that just by observing any of the two non–zero elements in the ﬁrst row
of Q1,0<y<1 in isolation we could have learned that the ﬁrst column of P1 does
13not have a unique maximal element. Otherwise setting some element in the ﬁrst
row of Q1,0<y<1 equal to some positive value that is not equal to 1 could not
have been optimal for maximizing tr(P1Q1). Note that this does not exclude
the possibility that the ﬁrst column of P1 is a zero column, but if we can further
assume that the ﬁrst column of P1 does not consist entirely of zeros, then we
also know that there must be some other non–zero elements in the ﬁrst row of
Q1,0<y<1 (at least one) whose corresponding elements in P1 are maximal ele-
ments of the ﬁrst column of P1 and which together with the originally observed
non–zero element in the ﬁrst row of Q1,0<y<1 add up to 1. Otherwise the ﬁrst
row of Q1,0<y<1 would not fully extract the maximum value of the ﬁrst column
of P1. The next lemma generalizes these observations.
Lemma 5 (Properties of P and Q revealed by best response). Let
P ∈ ∆n×m
w and Q ∈ ∆m×n
w .
(1) Suppose Q ∈ B(P).
(a) If qj?i? 6= 0 then pi?j? = maxi(pij?).
(b) If 0 < qj?i? < 1 then in addition there is some other pi0j? = maxi(pij?)
with i0 6= i?. And if it furthermore can be assumed that the j?-th col-
umn in P does not consist entirely of zeros, then it also must be true
that
P
i∈A(p·j?) qj?i = 1.
(2) Suppose P ∈ B(Q).
(a) If pi?j? 6= 0 then qj?i? = maxj(qji?).
(b) If 0 < pi?j? < 1 then in addition there is some qj0i? = maxj(qji?)
with j0 6= j?. And, if it furthermore can be assumed that the i?-th
column in Q does not consist entirely of zeros, then it also is true
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1.
Note that (1.a) and (2.a) of Lemma 5 are just the contrapositives of the
corresponding statements in Lemma 3.
5 Nash strategies
Via the bridge of Lemma 1—the notion of a Nash strategy that P has to be a
best response to Q, and Q has to be a best response to P—Lemmas 3 and 5
together characterize the Nash strategies of this game.
Coming back to the question about the bidirectionality of event–signal cor-
respondences raised by Hurford (1989) this can be stated as some minimal con-
sistency requirements that must prevail in a symmetric Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy.
(1) If pi?j? 6= 0, then qj?i? = 0 if and only if
14(a) qji? = 0 for all j, that is, event i? is never successfully communicated;
and
(b) there are some other (at least one) events that use signal j? with at
least the same probability as i?, and which cumulatively are inferred
by signal j? with full probability.
(2) If qj?i? 6= 0, then pi?j? = 0 if and only if
(a) pij? = 0 for all i, which means that signal j? remains idle; and
(b) there are some other (at least one) signals that induce event i? with at
least the same probability as j?, and which cumulatively communicate
event i? with full probability.
Proof. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy.
If pi?j? 6= 0, then by Lemma 5, qj?i? = maxj(q·i?). That is, if event i?
uses signal j? with some probability to get communicated, then no other signal
induces event i? with a higher probability than j?. This does not necessarily
imply that qj?i? 6= 0. But qj?i? = 0 can only be the case if qji? = 0 for all j,
which means that event i? is never successfully communicated. This proves part
(a) of the proposition.
In addition one of the two cases must be met: (i) Either pi?j? 6= maxi(pij?),
that is, there is at least some other event that uses j? with a higher probability—
indeed, this only is possible if qji? = 0 for all j, or (ii) pi?j? = maxi(pij?). But in
both cases, maxi(pij?) 6= 0, which by Lemma 3 implies that
P
i?6=i∈A(q·i?) qj?i =
1, which completes the proof (b).
Part (2) works by an analogous argument.
There is an uncountable inﬁnity of Nash strategies in this game. Note also
that the Ps and Qs of a Nash strategy may have columns that consist entirely
of zeros. In particular, a pair of zero–matrices with appropriate dimensions is a
Nash strategy of the corresponding sender–receiver game. 4
4The discussion of Nash strategies presented here can be seen as a complementary approach
to the one taken in Trapa and Nowak (2000). They ﬁrst characterize the speciﬁc class of
Nash strategies, that is given by the condition that neither P nor Q contains columns that
consist entirely of zeros; and then they show how by deleting and adding zero–columns and
corresponding rows, all other Nash strategies can be reduced to and constructed from these
particular Nash strategies, respectively. If neither P nor Q contains a zero–column, they ﬁnd
that L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m is a Nash strategy if and only if there exist real numbers p1,...,pn
and q1,...,qm such that for each j, the j-th column of P has its entries drawn from {0,pj}—
and pij = pj if and only if qji = qi; and such that for each i, the i-th column of Q has its entries
drawn from {0,qi}. As a matter of consistency, qji = qi if and only if pij = pj. Lemmas
1, 3 and 5 together with the no–zero–columns condition can be used to prove this result.
The advantage of the approach taken here is that it also can be used to encompasses other
conditions on P or Q, which proves to be particularly useful when it comes to characterize
neutrally stable states.
156 Neutrally stable states
Consider any of the pairs L1 = (P1,Q1) with Q1 ∈ B(P1) from Example 1. It
is easily veriﬁed that L1 is not only a Nash strategy but also a neutrally stable
state. Whenever tr(P1Q0
1) = tr(P1Q1) for some Q0
1 ∈ ∆3×3
w or tr(P0
1Q1) =
tr(P1Q1) for some P0
1 ∈ ∆3×3
w , then tr(P0
1Q0
1) = tr(P1Q1). By Remark 2 this is
suﬃcient for L1 to be a neutrally stable state. Consider instead the following
language.
Example 2.
P2 =


1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0

 and Q2 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1

.
L2 = (P2,Q2) deﬁnitely is a Nash strategy. Nevertheless, it does not fulﬁll
the condition for a neutrally stable state. To see why this is so, consider L0
2 =
(P0
2,Q0
2) with
P0
2 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0

 and Q0
2 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0

.
as an invading language. L0
2 is doing as well against L2, as L2 is doing against
itself,
F(L2,L0
2) = 2 = F(L2,L2).
But L0
2 against itself yields a strictly higher payoﬀ than L2 against L0
2,
F(L0
2,L0
2) = 3 > 2 = F(L0
2,L2),
and so L2 cannot be a neutrally stable state.
An obvious characteristic of L2 as opposed to L1 is that its sender as well
as its receiver matrix contains a column that consists entirely of zeros. It can
be shown that in general this is suﬃcient to destroy neutral stability.
Lemma 6. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If each of the two matrices,
P and Q, contains at least one column that consists entirely of zeros, then L
cannot be a neutrally stable state.
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition is straight forward. If there
are events that are never possibly successfully communicated (a zero column in
Q), then it cannot be evolutionarily stable—not even in the neutral sense—that
there are any idle signals (a zero column in P). Analogously, in the presence of
signals that are never used it cannot even be a neutrally evolutionarily stable
state if there are messages that are never understood. An invading language
that changes nothing about the existing linkages between events and signals but
that links in addition the idle signal to the event that is never understood clearly
is not doing worse against the resident language but can do better against itself.
16Nevertheless, a zero column in both matrices, P and Q, is not the only thing
that can happen to prevent a state from being neurally stable, nor is it the case
that the condition that neither P nor Q contains a zero column is suﬃcient to
guarantee neutral stability. The followig example indicates this.
Example 3.
P3 =


1 0 0
0 1 − α α
0 1 − α α


α∈(0,1)
and Q3 =


1 0 0
0 1 − β β
0 1 − β β


β∈(0,1)
.
L3 = (P3,Q3) is a Nash strategy. But, if everybody is playing L3, and
L0
3 = (P0
3,Q0
3) with
P0
3 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 and Q0
3 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


is introduced into the population, L0
3 eventually will take over. F(L3,L0
3) =
F(L3,L3), but F(L0
3,L0
3) > F(L0
3,L3), and so L3 = (P3,Q3) cannot even be
neutrally stable. Note that this is true even though neither P3 nor Q3 contains
a column that consists entirely of zeros. What destroys neutral stability in this
case is the fact that in both matrices, P and Q, there are columns with multiple
maximal elements that are positive but not equal to 1.
Some caution is in order: Contrary to what the above example suggests, it is
not always true that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium where some events share
the use of one particular signal, each of them also must share the use of all the
other signals that one of them uses in parallel. The following example clariﬁes
this remark.5
Example 4.
P4 =


0,5 0 0,5
0,5 0,5 0
0 0,5 0,5

 and Q4 =


0,5 0,5 0
0 0,5 0,5
0,5 0 0,5

.
It is easily checked that P4 ∈ B(Q4) and that Q4 in B(P4), and so L4 is
a Nash strategy. To see that L4 cannot be neutrally stable, it is suﬃcient to
consider L0
3 from the previous example as the invading strategy.
Other instances of Nash strategies that are not weakly evolutionarily stable
are cases where one of the two matrices—P or Q—contains a column with
multiple maximal elements strictly between 0 and 1, and the other matrix a
zero column.
Example 5.
P5 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0

 and Q5 =


1 0 0
0 1 − β β
0 0 β


β∈(0,1)
.
5Trapa and Nowak (2000) wrongly conclude this from an example with a P matrix of
dimensions 2 × 3. Example 4 is a speciﬁc 3 × 3 continuation of their example.
17Taking again L0
3 as the competing language, it can be checked that L5 also
fails to be a neutrally evolutionarily stable state.
The crucial thing in the case where one of the two matrices, P or Q, contains
a column with multiple maximal elements that are strictly between 0 and 1, is
that by the Nash property of L = (P,Q) alone the other matrix is bound to
contain a zero column or a column with multiple maximal elements that are
strictly between 0 and 1 as well.
Lemma 7. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If P [Q] contains at least
one column that has non-zero multiple maximal elements that are not equal to
1, then Q [P] contains
(i) at least two columns that have non-zero multiple maximal elements that
are not equal to 1, or
(ii) a zero column,
and L cannot be a neutrally stable state.
Here the intuition is that if the ambiguity created by instances of homonymy
or synonymy works into both directions, then this leaves enough degrees of free-
dom for rearranging the existing linkages between events and signals in such
a way that the ambiguity is resolved—and thereby increasing the total of cor-
rectly communicated messages—without loosing anything against the resident
language. The proof, again, is given in the appendix.
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions
We ﬁnally show that a Nash language is an evolutionarily stable state if and only
if P or Q satisﬁes the condition that if it has a column with multiple maximal
elements, then they are equal to 1. Note that this implies that at least P or Q
has no zero column.
Combining the Lemmas 6 and 7 we have that a Nash strategy cannot be a
neutrally stable state if
(i) P and Q contain a zero column, or if
(ii) P or Q contains a column with multiple maximal elements that are strictly
between 0 and 1.
The contrapositive of this statement yields a necessary condition for neutral
stability.
Proposition 2. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a neutrally stable state. Provided that
L = (P,Q) is a Nash strategy, then
(i) at least one of the two matrices P or Q has no zero column; and
(ii) neither P nor Q contains a column with multiple maximal elements that
are strictly between 0 and 1.
18Note that these conditions, of course, are also necessary conditions for an
evolutionarily stable state. For a neutrally stable state they also prove to be
suﬃcient.
Proposition 3. Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If P [Q] has no
column with multiple maximal elements that are not equal to 1,
(i) then Q [P] has no column with non–zero multiple maximal elements that
are not equal to 1; and
(ii) L = (P,Q) is a neutrally stable state.
The proof is given in the appendix. It basically relies on crosswise making
use of the best–response properties that must hold true between P and Q, as
well as between P and Q0, and Q and P0 of any invading language. Figure 1
oﬀers a shortcut to its intuition.
Combining Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 ﬁnally yields a complete char-
acterization of neutrally stable states for this game.
Theorem 1. Suppose L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m is a Nash strategy. L = (P,Q) is a
neutrally stable state if and only if P or Q satisﬁes the following condition: If
a column has multiple maximal elements, then they are equal to 1.
Proof. Just note that if conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed for
P or Q, by Proposition 3 this already implies that condition (ii) of Proposition
2 is also satisﬁed for Q or P respectively.
In general verifying neutral stability of a speciﬁc strategy involves taking
into account all the other possible strategies of this game. What we gain by
this statement is a criterion for neutral stability that allows us to tell whether
a speciﬁc strategy is neutrally stable, or not, just by checking the properties of
the single strategy. This provides a good tool for equilibrium selection.
Conclusions
An interpretation of this result is that in a neutrally stable state there can be
some but not too much ambiguity: One signal can be linked to two or more
events—honomymy; but if this is the case, then these events cannot make use
of any other signal to get communicated. One event can be linked to two or
more signals—synonymy; but if this is the case, then these signals cannot be
used to communicate any other event. Furthermore, as long as there are events
that are never possibly successfully communicated (a zero column in Q), there
cannot be any idle signal (a zero column in P), and vice versa.
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207 Appendix
Lemma 6.
Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If each of the two matrices, P and Q,
contains at least one column that consists entirely of zeros, then L cannot be a
neutrally stable state.
Proof. Suppose that L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m is a Nash strategy, and assume that
the j?–th column of P as well as the i?–th column of Q consist entirely of zero
elements.
To show that L = (P,Q) is not neutrally stable, we ﬁrst have to show that
there exists some L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m with L0 6= L such that F(L,L0) =
F(L,L), and second that F(L0,L0) > F(L0,L). Following Remark 2, for the
speciﬁc payoﬀ function that we use, this means that we have to look for a
L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m such that tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ) = tr(PQ0) and such that
tr(P0Q0) > tr(PQ).
Now, take as a candidate P0 the original P but with the entries in its i?–th
row substituted by the vector
p0
i?j =

1 for j = j?
0 otherwise ;
and take as a candidate Q0 the original Q but with the entries in its j?-th row
substituted by the vector
q0
j?i =

1 for i = i?
0 otherwise .
We ﬁrst check that, in deed, tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ). Since the elements of the
i?–th column of Q are all zero, the product of the i?–th column of Q with
the i?–th row of any sender matrix will be zero. So, whatever the elements
in the i?–th row of P might have been, we “loose” nothing by setting p0
i?j?
equal to 1. Since in constructing P0 from P we did not change the elements of
any other row, tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ). The analogous argument also gives us that
tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ).
What remains to be done, it to show that tr(P0Q0) > tr(PQ).
Note ﬁrst that
p0
ijq0
ji = pijqji whenever i 6= i? or j 6= j?.
On the other hand,
p0
i?j?q0
j?i? = 1,
whereas
pi?j?qj?i? = 0.
21So, summing over all i and j, we have that
X
i
X
j
p0
ijq0
ji =
X
i
X
j
pijqji + 1,
and L = (P,Q) cannot be a neutrally stable state.
Lemma 7.
Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If P [Q] contains at least one column
with multiple maximal elements strictly between 0 and 1, then Q [P] contains
(i) at least two columns with multiple maximal elements strictly between 0
and 1, or a zero column;
(ii) and L cannot be a neutrally stable state.
Proof. Suppose that L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m is a Nash strategy. As for Lemma 6, we
have to show that there is some L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m with tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ) =
tr(PQ0) and tr(P0Q0) > tr(PQ).
We give the proof for the case where the condition of the proposition applies
to Q. Analogous conclusions hold true for the case where it applies to P.
Suppose that the i?–th column of Q contains more than one maximum el-
ement that is positive but not equal to 1. Since Q is a best response to P, by
Lemma 5, for all j ∈ A(q·i?), pi?j is a maximal, but not the unique maximal
element of its respective column in P: If pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) was not a maxi-
mal element of the j–th column of P, then qji? could not be positive. If, on the
other hand, pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) was the unique maximal element of the j–th
column of P, then qji? would have to be exactly equal to 1. Note that this does
not exclude the possibility that for some j ∈ A(q·i?) the j–th column of P is a
zero column.
On the other hand, P is a best response to Q. By Lemma 3, this implies
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1, and that pi?j = 0 whenever j / ∈ A(q·i?). This means
that even though some of the pi?j with j ∈ A(q·i?) might be zero, not all of
them can be zero. At least one of them has to be positive—and if it is really
the only one, it has to be exactly equal to 1. Since, by assumption, A(q·i?)
has at least two elements, this implies that P has at least (i) two columns with
multiple maximal elements strictly between 0 and 1, or (ii) a zero column. This
proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
Suppose that for j?? with j?? ∈ A(q·i?), pi?j?? 6= 0. Note that we do not
rule out the possibility that pi?j?? is equal to 1. Since Q is a best response to
P, it must be true that
P
i∈A(p·j??) qj??i = 1. Remember, we know from above
that i? ∈ A(p·j??). But since 0 < qj??i? < 1 (and since the j??–th column of
P is not a zero column) there must be some i?? 6= i? with i?? ∈ A(p·j??) such
that qj??i?? 6= 0. Of course, since P is a best response to Q, qj??i?? is a maximal
element of the i??–th column of Q. In the case where maxi(pij??) = 1, qj??i??
might well be the unique maximal element of this column.
22For later use note that
X
j∈A(q·i?)
X
i
pijqji = 1.
To see why this is so, consider the following argument: We know from above
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1 and that all these elements in the i?–th row of P for
which j ∈ A(q·i?) are maximal elements of their respective columns. So
X
j∈A(q·i?)
max
i
pij = 1,
and Lemma 4 tells us that any maximizing receiver matrix Q “extracts” from P
exactly the sum of its column maxima, which gives the claim of the statement.
Now, we try to create an alternative Q0 that is doing as well against P, as
Q is doing against P; and an alternative P0 that is doing as well against Q, as
P is doing against Q.
Take as a candidate Q0 the original Q but exchange the entries in its j??–th
row by the vector
q0
j??i =

1 for i = i??
0 otherwise ,
and exchange its j?–th row by the vector
q0
j?i =

1 for i = i?
0 otherwise ,
where j? is some j ∈ A(q·i?) with j? 6= j??. Note that, since qj?i? 6= 0 and Q
is a best response to P, by Lemma 5 this also implies that pi?j? is a maximal
element of the i?–th column of P.
Since the original Q was a best response to P, and since in constructing Q0
form Q we did not change any rows other than the j??–th and j?–th row of Q,
all we have to do in order to show that tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ), is to show that the
j??–th and the j?–th row of Q0 successfully extract the maximum value of j??–
th and the j?–th column of P, respectively. We know from above that pi??j??
is a maximal element of the j??–th column of P, and that pi?j? is a maximal
element of the j?–th column of P. So setting their corresponding elements in
Q0, qj??i?? and qj?i?, equal to 1, clearly is optimal in order to maximize tr(PQ),
and so tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ).
As an alternative P0 take the original P but exchange the entries in its i??–th
row by the vector
p0
i??j =

1 for j = j??
0 otherwise ,
and the entries in its i?–th row by the vector
p0
i?j =

1 for j = j?
0 otherwise
23We also know from above that qj?i? is a maximal element of the i?–th column
of Q (by assumption deﬁnitely not its unique maximal element) and that qj??i??
is a maximal element of the i??–th column of Q. As pointed out above, it even
might be the unique maximal element of this column. In any case, setting pi?j?
and pi??j?? equal to 1 clearly is an optimal choice in order to maximize tr(PQ),
and so tr(P0Q) = tr(PQ).
What remains to be done, is to compare tr(P0Q0) to tr(PQ). Since p0
i?j?q0
j?i? =
1 and p0
i??j??q0
j??i?? = 1, we have that
X
j∈A(q·i?)
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji ≥ 2, (4)
whereas, as we have noted above,
X
j∈A(q·i?)
X
i
pijqji = 1.
We distinguish two cases now: Suppose ﬁrst that for the j?? ∈ A(q·i?) that
we have chosen above, pi?j?? = 1. Then, of course, also pi??j?? = 1. But this
implies that pi??j = 0 for all j / ∈ A(q·i?), and so
X
j/ ∈A(q·i?)
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji =
X
j/ ∈A(q·i?)
X
i
pijqji. (5)
Summing over all j, we have that
X
j
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji ≥
X
j
X
i
pijqji + 1,
and we are done.
The case where 0 < pi?j?? < 1 is a little bit more complicated. Equation (4)
still holds, but equation (5) is no longer necessarily true. It might well be that
there are some j / ∈ A(q·i?) for which pi??j 6= 0. Hence, in constructing P0 form
P, when we replace the i?? row in P by the vector (p0
i??j) that is 1 for j = j??
and 0 otherwise, it might well be the case that we nullify some positive entries
pi??j for which j / ∈ A(q·i?) that might be attributed some positive weight to by Q!
So when we multiply the elements p0
i??j for j / ∈ A(q·i?) with their corresponding
elements in Q0—which deﬁnitely are unchanged for j / ∈ A(q·i?)—it might well
be that we “loose” something as compared to the same expressions in tr(PQ).
Nevertheless, since pi?j?? 6= 0, what we “loose” this way cannot be greater than
1, and so overall we still have that
X
j
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji >
X
j
X
i
pijqji,
which completes the proof that L = (P,Q) cannot be a neutrally stable state.
24Proposition 3.
Let L = (P,Q) ∈ Ln,m a Nash strategy. If P [Q] has no column with multiple
maximal elements that are not equal to 1,
(i) then Q [P] has no column with non–zero multiple maximal elements that
are not equal to 1; and
(ii) L = (P,Q) is a neutrally stable state.
Proof. Suppose that L = (P,Q) is a Nash strategy. We give the proof for
the case where the condition of the proposition is given for P. Because of the
symmetric roles of P and Q, analogous conclusions hold true for the case where
it is satisﬁed for Q.
If P has no column with multiple maximal elements that are not equal to
1, then for every ﬁxed column of P there are only three possible cases. Its
maximum is either
(1) unique and equal to 1, or
(2) unique but not equal to 1, or
(3) not unique but equal to 1.
Note that, in particular, there is no zero column in P.
In order to show that L = (P,Q) is a neutrally stable state, using the symme-
try of the payoﬀ function, we have to show that if there is a L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m
such that F(L,L) = F(L,L0), then it should be the case that F(L0,L0) ≤
F(L,L). We know already from Remark 2 that for the speciﬁc payoﬀ function
we use, this amounts to the condition that if
tr(PQ0) = tr(PQ) = tr(P0Q),
for some L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m, then
tr(P0Q0) ≤ tr(PQ).
Starting with the assumptions on the columns of P, for each of these three
cases separately, we will ﬁrst try to exploit all the information we can get about
the corresponding rows in Q and the other columns in P that derive from the
fact that P and Q are maximizers for each other. Second, we will consider
the consequences for the corresponding rows of all the Q0 ∈ A(P) and the
corresponding columns of all the P0 ∈ A(Q). Multiplying columns with their
corresponding rows, we will see that, for each of these three cases, these column–
times–row products for P0 and Q0 are always smaller than or equal to their
corresponding expressions for the original P and Q. Summing over all these
products ﬁnally yields the result.
Case 1. (One event exclusively linked to one signal.) Suppose that pi?j? = 1 is the
unique maximal element in the j?–th column of P.
25Since Q is a best response to P, by Lemma 3, we have that qj?i? = 1,
and that qj?i = 0 whenever i 6= i?. Note that, since there are no entries
greater than 1, this immediately implies that qj?i? is a maximal element
of the i?–th column of Q.
Since the elements in each row of P add up at most to 1, we also have that
pi?j = 0 whenever j 6= j?. Since by assumption there are no columns in P
that consist entirely of zeros, all these elements in the i?-th row of P that
are equal to 0, cannot be maximal elements of their respective columns
j 6= j?. Since Q is a best response to P, by Lemma 3 this implies that
qji? = 0 whenever j 6= j?. So,
qji? =

1 for j = j?
0 otherwise . (6)
This means that qj?i? = 1 is not only a but the unique maximal element
in the i?–th column of Q.
Now, we turn to Q0 ∈ A(P) and P0 ∈ A(Q). Since by assumption, pi?j? is
the unique maximal element in the j?–th column of P, by Lemma 3, we
have that
q0
j?i? = 1 = qj?i? and q0
j?i = 0 = qj?i ∀ i 6= i?, (7)
for all Q0 ∈ A(P).
Since in this case, we also have that qj?i? = 1 is the unique maximal
element in the i?–th column of Q, Lemma 3 also tells us that
p0
i?j? = 1 = pi?j?, (8)
for all P0 ∈ A(Q).
Taking (7) and (8) together, we have that
X
i
p0
ij?q0
j?i = 1 =
X
i
pij?qj?i, (9)
for all L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m such that P0 ∈ A(Q) and Q0 ∈ A(P).
Figure 1.1 illustrates this case.
Case 2. (Synonymy.) Suppose that 0 < pi?j? < 1 is the unique maximal element
in the j?–th column of P.
As in the previous case, from Q being a best response to P, we have that
qj?i? = 1, and that qj?i = 0 for all i 6= i?. Since there are no elements
greater than 1, this again implies that qj?i? is a maximal element of the
i?–th column of Q. But now, since pi?j? 6= 1, by Lemma 5, the fact that P
is a best response to Q, implies that qj?i? cannot be the unique maximal
element in the i?–th column of Q, and, of course, since the elements in
each row may not add up to something greater than 1, we have that for
26all j ∈ A(q·i?), qji = 0 whenever i 6= i?. But since the maximum of
the i?–th column of Q is not equal to zero, by Lemma 5 we also have
that
P
j∈A(q·i?) pi?j = 1, and that pi?j = 0 for all j / ∈ A(q·i?). Together
with the assumption that 0 < pi?j? < 1, this in turn implies that for
all j ∈ A(q·i?), pji? 6= 1. On the other hand, since for all j ∈ A(q·i?),
qji? = 1 6= 0 and Q is a best response to P, by Lemma 5, we also know
that for all j ∈ A(q·i?), pji? is a maximal element of its respective column
in P. Together with the assumption that P has no zero column and no
column with multiple maximal elements strictly between 0 and 1, this
implies that for all j ∈ A(q·i?), 0 < pi?j < 1 is the unique maximal
element of its respective column in P.
In perfect analogy to the previous case, the fact that pi?j = 0 for all
j / ∈ A(q·i?) together with the assumption that P does not contain any
zero column implies that qji? = 0 whenever j / ∈ A(q·i?). So,
qji? =

1 for j ∈ A(q·i?)
0 otherwise . (10)
We now turn again to Q0 and P0. Since for all j ∈ A(q·i?) it is true that
0 < pi?j < 1 is the unique maximal element of its respective column, by
Lemma 3 we have that that for all j ∈ A(q·i?)
q0
ji? = 1 = qji?, and q0
ji = 0 = qji ∀ i 6= i?, (11)
for all Q0 ∈ A(P). On the other hand, the fact that the i?–th column of
Q has multiple maximal elements implies that
X
j∈A(q·i?)
p0
i?j = 1 =
X
j∈A(q·i?)
pi?j, (12)
for all P0 ∈ A(Q).
Putting (11) and (12) together we have that
X
j∈A(q·i?)
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji =
X
j∈A(q·i?)
X
i
pijqji = 1, (13)
for all L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m such that P0 ∈ A(Q) and Q0 ∈ A(P).
This case is illustrated by Figure 1.2.
Case 3. (Homonymy.) Suppose that pi?j? is equal to 1, but not the unique maximal
element in the j?-th column of P. So, i? ∈ A(p·j?), but there is at least
one i?? 6= i? such that i ∈ A(p·j?).
In this case, from Q being a best response to P, by Lemma 3 we only
have that
P
i∈A(p·j?) qj?i = 1, and that qj?i = 0 whenever i / ∈ A(p·j?). In
particular, this does not imply that qj?i 6= 0 for all i ∈ A(p·j?).
27On the other hand, from the constraint that the elements in each row
cannot add up to something greater than 1, we also have that for all
i ∈ A(p·j?), pij = 0 whenever j 6= j?. Since by assumption P does not
contain any column that consist entirely of zeros, any zero element in P
can never be a maximal element of its respective column, and since Q is a
best response to P, we have that for all i ∈ A(p·j?), qji = 0 for all j 6= j?.
This implies that all the qj?i such i ∈ A(p·j?) are maximal elements of
their respective columns. But since not all them are necessarily non–zero,
this means that they are not necessarily the unique maximal element of
this column, and there might be a zero column in Q. But, if qj?i with
i ∈ A(p·j?) is equal to some positive value, then it deﬁnitely will be the
unique maximal element of its column in P. So,
qji =

maxj(qji) for j = j?
0 otherwise . (14)
We now turn to Q0 and P0. By Lemma 3 we have that
X
i∈A(p·j?)
q0
j?i = 1 =
X
i∈A(p·j?)
qj?i, and q0
j?i = 0 = qj?i ∀ i / ∈ A(p·j?), (15)
for all Q0 ∈ A(P).
The case of P0 ∈ A(Q) is a little bit more complicated. As we have seen
above, whenever qj?i 6= 0 for some i ∈ A(p·j?), then it deﬁnitely will be
the unique maximal element of its respective column in Q. By Lemma
3, its corresponding element in P0 then has to be equal to 1. But if for
some i ∈ A(p·j?), qj?i = 0, then p0
ij? does not have to be equal to 1—even
though it can be equal to 1 or to some other positive value. So, if for some
i ∈ A(pij?),
p0
ij? 6= 0 ⇒ pij? = 1. (16)
Taking (15) and (16) together, we have that
X
i
p0
ij?q0
j?i ≤
X
i
pij?qj?i = 1, (17)
for all L0 = (P0,Q0) ∈ Ln,m such that P0 ∈ A(Q) and Q0 ∈ A(P).
Figure 1.3 illustrates this case.
So, whatever cases out of these three possible ones might be captured by
any sender matrix P that is part of a Nash strategy L = (P,Q), we have that
(i) the maximum of each column in Q is either unique or equal to 1; and
(ii) summing over all j and over all i, we see that
X
j
X
i
p0
ijq0
ji = tr(P0Q0) ≤ tr(PQ) =
X
j
X
i
pijqji,
which means that L = (P,Q) is a neutrally stable state.
28(i) comes from (6), (14) and (10); whereas (ii) is an implication of (9), (17) and
(13) together.
29P =


− − < 1
− − < 1
0 0 1


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q)
U U U U U U U U U U U U
** U U U U U U U U U U U U U
Q∈B(P) //
P∈B(P)
oo Q =


− − 0
− − 0
0 0 1


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q) iiiiiiiiiiiii
ttiiiiiiiiiiii
P0 =


− − −
− − −
0 0 1

 Q0 =


− − 0
− − 0
0 0 1


Figure 1.1. One event exclusively linked to one signal.
P =


− < 1 − α < α
− < 1 − α < α
0 1 − α α


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q)
V V V V V V V V V V
** V V V V V V V V V V V V V V
Q∈B(P) //
P∈B(P)
oo Q =


− − 0
0 0 1
0 0 1


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q) hhhhhhhhhhhhhh
tthhhhhhhhhhh
P0 =


− − −
− − −
0 1 − α0 α0

 Q0 =


− − 0
0 0 1
0 0 1


Figure 1.2. Synonymy.
P =


− − < 1
0 0 1
0 0 1


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q)
V V V V V V V V V V V V
** V V V V V V V V V V V
Q∈B(P) //
P∈B(P)
oo Q =


− 0 0
− 0 0
0 1 − β β


Q
0∈A(P), P
0∈A(Q) hhhhhhhhhhhh
tthhhhhhhhhhhhh
P0 =


− − −
0? 0? 1?
0? 0? 1?

 Q0 =


− 0 0
− 0 0
0 1 − β0 β0


Figure 1.3. Homonymy.
Figure 1. Proof of Proposition 3. We basically always apply the same
procedure. First we exploit the fact that P and Q are reciprocally maximizers for
each other. Second, we consider the properties of all the possible P0 and Q0 that are
also best responses to Q and P, respectively. Finally, we show that taking together
any P0 with any Q0 cannot yield something that is doing better than P together
with Q.
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